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The ability to imagine the future is a complex mental faculty that depends on an ensemble of 
cognitive processes supported by an extended set of brain regions. Our aim here was to shed 
light on one key component of future thinking—personal goal processing—and to determine 
its neural correlates during both directed and spontaneous forms of thoughts. To address this 
question, we performed separate ALE meta-analyses of neuroimaging studies of episodic 
future thinking, mind-wandering, and personal goal processing, and then investigated the 
commonalities and differences in brain activity between these three domains. The results 
showed that the three domains activated a common set of brain regions within the default 
network and, most notably, the medial prefrontal cortex. This finding suggests that the medial 
prefrontal cortex mediates the processing of personal goals during both episodic future 
thinking and mind-wandering. Differences in activation were also observed, and notably 
regions supporting cognitive control processes (the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) were 
recruited to a lesser extent during mind-wandering than experimentally directed future 
thinking, suggesting that different kinds of self-generated thoughts may recruit varying levels 







A remarkable feature of the human mind is the ability to decouple the focus of 
attention from the immediate environment to project oneself into other places and times 
(Buckner and Carroll, 2007; D'Argembeau, 2012; Schacter and Addis, 2007; Suddendorf et 
al., 2009; Tulving, 2005). Perhaps most importantly, we can picture in our minds a variety of 
possible forthcoming events and “pre-experience” what it would be like to encounter these 
imagined situations (e.g., how one would feel, how one could act, the potential implications of 
our actions, and so on). Although not without flaws, this capacity—referred to as episodic 
future thinking (EFT)—contributes to many important aspects of human cognition and 
behavior, such as planning, decision making, and self-control (see e.g., Bechara and Damasio, 
2005; Boyer, 2008; D'Argembeau et al., 2011; Schacter, 2012), which likely explains why it 
has become the focus of growing interest in psychology and neuroscience in the last decade 
(for recent reviews, see Klein, 2013; Mullally and Maguire, 2013; Schacter et al., 2012; 
Seligman et al., 2013; Szpunar, 2010).  
Recent neuroimaging studies have shown that EFT is underpinned by an extended set 
of brain regions that comprises the medial prefrontal (mPFC), posterior cingulate (PCC) and 
restrosplenial (Rsp) cortices, medial and lateral temporal regions, posterior inferior parietal 
lobules (pIPL), and parts of the lateral prefrontal cortex (PFC; e.g., Addis et al., 2007; 
Botzung et al., 2008; D'Argembeau et al., 2008; Schacter et al., 2012; Spreng et al., 2009; 
Szpunar et al., 2007). These findings suggest that the ability to project oneself into future 
scenarios is complex and multifaceted, and depends on an ensemble of various cognitive 
processes (D'Argembeau et al., 2010a; Klein, 2013; Schacter et al., 2012). Furthermore, many 
of the brain regions that have been associated with EFT are also commonly engaged in other 




navigation (e.g., Buckner et al., 2008; Schilbach et al., 2008; Spreng et al., 2009; Van 
Overwalle, 2009). These brain areas are indeed part of a functional network—commonly 
referred to as the default network (DN)—which may play a general role in internally directed 
or self-generated thought (for recent reviews, see Andrews-Hanna, 2012; Andrews-Hanna et 
al., 2014b; Smallwood et al., 2012). However, the precise nature of the cognitive processes 
involved in EFT and other forms of self-generated thoughts, as well as their specific neural 
correlates, are not fully understood and still remain debated (Buckner et al., 2008; Hassabis 
and Maguire, 2009; Schacter et al., 2008).  
Among the various cognitive processes involved in EFT, the processing of personal 
goals might be particularly important in shaping the mental representations of future events. 
According to this view, EFT does not solely consist in using episodic details and semantic 
knowledge to construct novel and coherent event representations (Hassabis et al., 2007; 
Hassabis and Maguire, 2009; Schacter et al., 2012), but is also strongly influenced by the 
individual’s personal goals and motives (Christian et al., 2013; D'Argembeau and Demblon, 
2012; D'Argembeau and Mathy, 2011; D'Argembeau et al., 2010b; Grysman et al., 2013; 
Johnson and Sherman, 1990). Personal goals are hierarchically organized mental 
representations of desired end-states that impact and drive cognition and behavior (Austin and 
Vancouver, 1996; Conway, 2005; Conway, 2009; Fishbach and Ferguson, 2007), and an 
important function of EFT may precisely be to construct detailed representations or 
simulations of goal-relevant information (D'Argembeau, 2015; Schacter, 2012). In line with 
this view, there is evidence that personal goals facilitate access to episodic details when 
constructing episodic future thoughts (D'Argembeau and Mathy, 2011), help structure and 
organize these thoughts in meaningful themes and causal sequences (D'Argembeau and 
Demblon, 2012; Demblon and D'Argembeau, 2014), and shape the content of future 




Although behavioral studies suggest that EFT and personal goals are intimately 
related, relatively little is known about the brain regions supporting goal processing during 
EFT. Among the few neuroimaging studies that investigated this issue, D'Argembeau et al. 
(2010b) asked their participants to imagine future events that were either related to their 
personal goals or plausible but unrelated to their goals. By contrasting these two conditions, 
the authors found that midline brain regions corresponding to key nodes of the DN (i.e., the 
mPFC and PCC) were more activated when participants were thinking about goal-related than 
goal-unrelated future events, a result consistent with other studies of personal goal processing 
(e.g., Johnson et al., 2006; Preminger et al., 2011). These findings suggest that cortical 
midline structures may support the processing of personal goals during EFT. Another set of 
studies (Gerlach et al., 2014; Spreng and Schacter, 2012; Spreng et al., 2010) has further 
shown that goal-directed autobiographical planning (i.e., imagining taking various steps and 
actions in the future to achieve personal goals) depends on the functional coupling between 
the DN and the frontoparietal control network (e.g., the dorsolateral PFC and anterior IPL). 
This suggests that, in addition to midline DN structures, the frontoparietal control network 
also plays an important role in personal goal processing, and may contribute to monitor and 
integrate future-oriented thoughts in coherent sequences to achieve imagined end-states 
(Gerlach et al., 2014; Spreng et al., 2010).  
With the exception of the few studies described above, most neuroimaging studies did 
not explicitly investigate the contribution of goal-related processes in EFT. Yet, it is likely 
that goal-related representations were often spontaneously activated in these studies (e.g., for 
constructing future thoughts that are deemed plausible with respect to the individual’s life; 
D'Argembeau and Van der Linden, 2012) and that some of the activated brain regions 
reflected such goal-related processes. Here we investigated this possibility by performing 




processing on the other hand, to determine the commonalities and differences in the brain 
regions associated with these two areas of research. If personal goals are, as suggested, a key 
component of EFT (D'Argembeau and Mathy, 2011; D'Argembeau et al., 2010b), then 
substantial overlap should be found between these two domains in terms of associated brain 
activations. However, as mentioned above, EFT involves multiple cognitive processes 
(D'Argembeau et al., 2010a) and some of the brain regions supporting the imagination of 
future events should be unrelated to personal goal processing per se. In particular, EFT 
involves the construction of detailed representations of specific events (referred to as episodic 
simulation or scene construction), which in part depends on the medial temporal lobe and Rsp 
(e.g., Addis and Schacter, 2011; Hassabis et al., 2007; Hassabis and Maguire, 2009). On the 
other hand, personal goal processing can be more or less abstract (e.g., by focusing on general 
aspects of one's behavior rather than specific situations; Fishbach and Ferguson, 2007) and 
thus does not necessarily involve such scene construction processes.  
In addition to clarifying the neural correlates of personal goal processing in typical 
EFT tasks, we also aimed at investigating this question in the context of spontaneous or 
unconstrained self-generated thoughts. A long tradition of research suggests that mind-
wandering—the spontaneous occurrence of thoughts whose content is unrelated to our 
immediate circumstances (Singer, 1993; Smallwood and Schooler, 2006; Stawarczyk et al., 
2011a)—is closely related to the individual’s personal goals and concerns, and contributes to 
planning and preparing for the future (Antrobus et al., 1966; Klinger, 1978; Klinger, 2013; 
Smallwood and Schooler, 2006). It has indeed been found that a substantial part of mind-
wandering episodes involves goal-directed and personally relevant future events (e.g., Baird 
et al., 2011; Song and Wang, 2012; Stawarczyk et al., 2013; Stawarczyk et al., 2011a), and 
that priming personal goals influences the content and frequency of subsequent mind-




Kane, 2013; Stawarczyk et al., 2011a). Furthermore, neuroimaging studies suggest that mind-
wandering is associated with activations in similar DN areas as EFT and personal goal 
processing (e.g., Christoff et al., 2009; Mason et al., 2007; Stawarczyk et al., 2011a).  
Although these results suggest that future thinking and personal goal processing are 
important components of mind-wandering episodes, the brain regions that specifically support 
these processes have not been directly investigated. To address this question, we included 
mind-wandering as a third domain of investigation in our meta-analyses. Given the influence 
of personal goals on the content and frequency of mind-wandering episodes, as well as their 
preponderant future temporal orientation (e.g., Stawarczyk et al., 2011a), we expected to 
detect substantial overlap between mind-wandering, EFT, and personal goal processing in DN 
regions. On the other hand, a key difference between these three domains is that, by 
definition, mind-wandering occurs spontaneously (and often involuntarily) during task 
performance (e.g., Stawarczyk et al., 2013; Stawarczyk et al., 2011a), whereas studies of EFT 
and personal goal processing generally involve controlled and voluntary forms of thoughts 
that are induced by experimental instructions. We therefore expected that regions supporting 
cognitive control processes, such as the dorsolateral PFC (Spreng et al., 2009; Spreng et al., 
2010), would show higher activity during directed forms of EFT and personal goal processing 
compared to mind-wandering episodes.  
In summary, our aim was to investigate the commonalities and differences in the 
neural correlates of EFT, personal goal processing, and mind-wandering to shed further light 
on the contribution of personal goal-related processes to both directed and spontaneous forms 
of self-generated thoughts. To do so, we first performed three distinct meta-analyses (one for 
each domain of interest) using the activation likelihood estimation (ALE) method—a 
quantitative, automated, and highly validated procedure for voxel-wise meta-analyses of 




Turkeltaub et al., 2002; Turkeltaub et al., 2012). Then, we performed (1) conjunction analyses 
between each domain to assess the potential overlaps between the clusters identified in each 
meta-analysis and (2) subtraction analyses to determine the brain regions that are more 
specifically associated with each domain. To the extent that personal goals play an important 
role in EFT and mind-wandering, we expected significant overlaps and convergences in 
neural activations between the three domains in brain regions that have been previously 
associated with personal goal processing, that is, midline regions of the DN and in particular 
the mPFC (e.g., D'Argembeau et al., 2010b; Johnson et al., 2006; Packer and Cunningham, 
2009). Furthermore, although our main goal was to examine the commonalities between the 
neural correlates associated with these three areas of research, some differences in brain 
activations were also expected. First, we expected regions involved in cognitive control (e.g., 
the lateral PFC; Niendam et al., 2012) to be less active during mind-wandering than 
experimentally directed EFT and personal goal processing. Second, we also expected that 
regions supporting scene construction processes (e.g., the medial temporal areas; Hassabis et 
al., 2007; Hassabis and Maguire, 2009) would be more activated in association with EFT than 




2.1. Selection of studies 
 We performed a systematic literature search to select functional neuroimaging studies 
on EFT, personal goal processing, and mind-wandering. The search was conducted in the 
Medline database and only peer-reviewed articles written in English from January 1990 up to 
August 2014 were considered for inclusion in the meta-analyses. We searched for studies 




with the specific terms “future thinking,” “future events,” or “prospection” for the EFT 
domain, “personal goals,” “future goals,” “goal states,” “autobiographical planning,” and 
“hopes and aspirations,” for the personal goals domain, and “mind-wandering,” “task-
unrelated thoughts,” or “stimulus-independent thoughts” for the mind-wandering domain1. 
This search process yielded 132 papers for EFT, 41 for personal goal processing, and 64 for 
mind-wandering. Additional studies were also added in each domain after examining the 
reference list of the articles found in the initial search process. Finally, studies that were 
included in previous meta-analyses on EFT (Spreng et al., 2009; Viard et al., 2012) and mind-
wandering (Fox et al., in press) were also considered.  
 
2.2. Inclusion criteria 
 The general inclusion criteria for the papers were as follows: only peer-reviewed 
articles that reported original experiments were included in the analyses; theoretical papers, 
reviews of the literature, and studies that reexamined already published data were excluded. 
Only studies that used PET or fMRI and reported their results in a standard reference frame 
(MNI or Talairach space) were included; studies that only reported region-of-interest (ROI) 
analyses were excluded. Studies that solely focused on functional connectivity analyses such 
as independent component analyses (Kiviniemi et al., 2003) or psychophysical interaction 
analyses (Friston et al., 1997) were excluded. Studies on clinical samples were excluded 
except when they reported separate results for the control group or common results for both 
the control group and the clinical group (e.g., Johnson et al., 2009). Studies involving healthy 
older adults were included (e.g., Spreng and Schacter, 2012). For papers reporting several 
                                                             
1 For instance, the research terms used in Pubmed for the future thinking domain were: “(fmri 
OR PET OR neuroimaging) AND ("future thinking" OR "future events" OR "prospection") 




experiments with independent samples, each of the experiment was considered individually 
and all appropriate data were included (e.g., Johnson et al., 2006; McGuire et al., 1996). Only 
one contrast per experiment was selected for inclusion in the analyses.  
 The specific inclusion criteria for EFT were as follows: only studies that involved the 
mental simulation of specific events were included; studies that asked participants to merely 
talk about their future (e.g., Okuda et al., 2003) or to make judgment about personal future 
events without the explicit instruction to mentally simulate specific situations (e.g., Abraham 
et al., 2008; Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010) were excluded. Studies that contrasted different 
categories of future events (e.g., familiar versus unfamiliar events; Szpunar et al., 2009) but 
did not include a control task that did not require EFT were also excluded. In total, 16 studies 
were included in the analyses (for details, see Table I).  
 
[Insert Table I near here] 
 
For the personal goal domain, we only included studies in which participants were 
explicitly instructed to reflect on personal goals; studies examining the neural activity related 
to the incidental exposition to personal goals without explicit instructions to reflect upon these 
goals were excluded from the analyses (e.g., Eddington et al., 2007; Strauman et al., 2012). 
Studies involving goal-directed thoughts in scenarios that were not selected on the basis of the 
participants’ personal goals were also excluded (e.g., Gerlach et al., 2011). In total, nine 
studies were included in the analyses (see Table II). It should be noted that four of these 
studies required participants to separately reflect on hopes and aspirations (promotion focus) 
versus duties and obligations (prevention focus) (e.g., Johnson et al., 2006; Packer and 
Cunningham, 2009). Here, we only included the contrasts associated with hopes and 




of personal goals generally referred to aspirations rather than obligations. Indeed, the study by 
D'Argembeau et al. (2010b) clearly investigated hopes and aspirations, and the instructions in 
Preminger et al. (2011) were to “generate novel/unrehearsed thoughts and think what you 
want and can do in order to advance your research project [italics added]” and thus also had a 
clear promotion focus. For the remaining studies (Gerlach et al., 2014; Spreng and Schacter, 
2012; Spreng et al., 2010), we asked 24 independent individuals (16 females; mean age = 
28.71, SD = 7.04) who were blind to the purpose of the present meta-analysis to decide 
whether each personal goal used in these studies reflected mainly hopes and aspirations or 
duties and obligations. The data showed that personal goals in each of these studies were 
mostly hopes and aspirations, with a mean of 77% (SD = 12) of hopes and aspirations in 
Gerlach et al. (2014), 73% (SD = 17) in Spreng et al. (2010), and 68% (SD = 17) in Spreng 
and Schacter (2012).  
  
[Insert Table II near here] 
 
Regarding the mind-wandering domain, we only included studies that had some 
measure of mind-wandering: studies in which mind-wandering was assessed online in the 
scanner (e.g., Christoff et al., 2009; Stawarczyk et al., 2011b), studies in which mind-
wandering was retrospectively assessed after the scanning session (e.g., Dumontheil et al., 
2010; McGuire et al., 1996), and studies in which mind-wandering was measured in 
conditions similar to those employed during scanning (e.g., Binder et al., 1999; Mason et al., 
2007). Thus, studies on spontaneous thoughts in which mind-wandering episodes were not 
explicitly measured were excluded (e.g., Christoff et al., 2004). Studies on spontaneous 
thoughts that did not distinguish between mind-wandering and task-related thoughts were also 




decided to exclude the study by D'Argembeau et al. (2005) because the contrast reported in 
that study was of a different nature than the contrasts used in other studies of mind-
wandering. Specifically, the tasks to which rest was compared in D'Argembeau et al. (2005) 
involved (directed) internal thinking and a recent review of the literature (Dixon et al., 2014) 
has shown that spontaneous versus directed forms of internal cognition recruits highly similar 
brain regions. Thus, many of the processes associated with mind-wandering during rest were 
similarly involved in the control tasks and, consequently, the brain regions supporting these 
processes were probably subtracted out in the reported contrast. We also excluded the study 
by Wang et al. (2009), for two reasons. First, this study did not perform voxel-wise 
correlations between brain activity and reports of mind-wandering frequency during scanning, 
but instead reported correlations with a questionnaire investigating the general tendency to 
mind-wander in daily life. Second, and most importantly, the authors did not report all 
coordinates in their correlation analyses but only regions that also showed greater activity 
during a control memory task (in which there was the lowest rate of mind-wandering) 
compared to rest. Whether the reported coordinates reflect the entire brain activations 
associated with mind-wandering is thus highly questionable. Finally, studies involving 
experienced meditators were excluded (e.g., Hasenkamp et al., 2012), as meditation 
experience might be associated with differences in mind-wandering experience and its 
associated neural correlates (Brewer et al., 2011). It should be noted, however, that including 
these latter studies did not alter the general patterns of findings. In total, nine studies were 
included in the analyses (for details, see Table III). 
 
[Insert Table III near here] 
 




All analyses were performed using the Brain Map Application Ginger ALE, Version 
2.3 (http://brainmap.org/ale/). Out of the 35 studies included, 23 used the MNI stereotactic 
space as the standard reference frame. Coordinates for the 12 remaining studies reported in 
the Talairach space were converted to the MNI stereotactic space using the icbm2tal 
transformation algorithm (Lancaster et al., 2007).  
A detailed description of the procedure underlying ALE meta-analyses can be found 
elsewhere (Eickhoff et al., 2012; Eickhoff et al., 2009; Turkeltaub et al., 2002; Turkeltaub et 
al., 2012) and will be only briefly summarized here. In short, in order for ALE analyses to 
find convergences of 3D peak coordinates across contrasts, the reported foci for each study 
are modelled as the center of a 3D Gaussian probability distribution whose width is 
empirically determined and automatically included (Eickhoff et al., 2009). Probability values 
of all foci in a particular experiment are calculated and combined for each voxel, resulting in a 
modelled activation (MA) map that represents a summary of the results of that specific 
experiment taking into account the spatial uncertainty associated with each reported 
coordinate. ALE scores are then calculated on a voxel-by-voxel basis by taking the union of 
these individual MA maps and thus reflect the convergence of results at each location. In the 
present study, a non-additive ALE method was chosen to restrict the number of inflated ALE 
values resulting from contrasts with many closely located activation foci. An advantage of 
this method is to reduce the risk for within-experiment effects rather than the between-
experiment concordance to be the cause of significant ALE values (Turkeltaub et al., 2012). 
Next, the significance of ALE values is assessed using a random-effects significance test 
against the null hypothesis that localization of activity is independent between studies. To 
correct for multiple comparisons, we used cluster-level inference in the present study. A 
cluster forming threshold of p < .001 (uncorrected at the voxel-level) was used and the size of 




distribution of cluster sizes determined by 5000 random permutations of the data. This latter 
threshold corresponds to a cluster size identical or larger than 5% of the clusters obtained 
when applying the above mentioned cluster forming threshold to 5000 ALE maps with 
random relocations of activation foci within each experiment (Eickhoff et al., 2012).   
Next, conjunction analyses were performed to identify the voxels commonly activated 
across the three domains. These analyses were computed using the voxel-wise minimum 
value of the input ALE images such that only significant clusters in the individual analyses 
were included (Eickhoff et al., 2011). Finally, the ALE maps were compared between 
contrasts of interest using the ALE subtraction analyses (Laird et al., 2005). A particularity of 
the ALE subtraction analyses is that they are performed on the already thresholded ALE maps 
and it is therefore advised to use a more lenient threshold than in the individual meta-analyses 
to avoid inflating false negative results. As cluster-level inference is not available in Ginger 
ALE for meta-analytic subtractions, 5000 permutations were used in the present study to 
obtain the null distribution and a threshold of p < .05 (uncorrected) was chosen for each 
analysis with a minimum cluster size of 200 mm³. This cluster size of 200 mm³ corresponds to 
the minimal size determined by the cluster-level inference for the individual meta-analyses 
(see Table IV). Using smaller minimal cluster size for the subtraction analyses did not change 
the general pattern of findings.  
All the activations presented below are reported in MNI coordinates and overlaid on a 
MNI-normalized template (Colin27_T1_seg_MNI.nii) using Mango 








3.1. Individual meta-analyses 
To examine the brain regions associated with EFT, personal goal processing, and 
mind-wandering, we first performed individual ALE meta-analyses for each domain of 
investigation considered individually.  
 
3.1.1 Episodic future thinking 
The meta-analysis of activation foci associated with EFT revealed significant 
convergence of activation in 11 clusters. These clusters were located in the mPFC and PCC 
extending into the right Rsp and posterior parahippocampal cortices (PHC), as well as 
bilaterally in the anterior PHC extending into the hippocampi, pIPL, middle temporal gyri, 
and middle/superior frontal gyri (see Table IV, Figure 1). 
 
[Insert Figure 1 near here] 
 
3.1.2 Personal goal processing 
For personal goal processing, the meta-analysis identified 12 clusters of significant 
activation likelihood. As expected, several of these clusters were located in areas similar to 
those found for EFT, including the mPFC, PCC, right PHC, left middle temporal gyrus, left 
superior frontal gyrus, and bilateral pIPL. In addition, this analysis also revealed clusters of 
activation likelihood in the left caudate nucleus and bilaterally in the inferior frontal gyri 
(IFG; see Table IV, Figure 2).  
 






 The meta-analysis of brain activity related to mind-wandering yielded six clusters of 
significant activation likelihood in areas highly similar to those found for EFT and personal 
goal processing. These areas included the mPFC, PCC/precuneus, left pIPL, left Rsp/PHC, 
and left middle temporal gyrus (see Table IV, Figure 3). 
 
[Insert Table IV near here] 
 
[Insert Figure 3 near here] 
 
3.2. Conjunction analyses 
 We next performed conjunction analyses to examine the extent to which the clusters of 
significant activation likelihood found for each domain of investigation overlapped. In its 
current version, Ginger ALE does not permit to perform conjunction analyses between more 
than two ALE images. We therefore computed conjunction analyses for each combination of 
domains considered two-by-two and then overlaid the three sets of results on the same 
template to visually examine the potential overlaps between all of them. As expected, 
substantial overlap was found between the different domains. More specifically, the 
conjunction analyses revealed common activations in (1) the mPFC, PCC, left pIPL, left PHC, 
and left middle temporal gyrus for EFT and mind-wandering, (2) the mPFC, PCC, bilateral 
pIPL, right PHC and left middle temporal gyrus for EFT and personal goals,2 and (3) the 
                                                             
2 It should be noted that the contrasts selected from three studies included in the personal 
goals meta-analysis not only involved goal processing, but also EFT (i.e., Spreng et al., 2010; 
Spreng & Schacter, 2012; Gerlach et al., 2014). To examine whether the peaks from these 
three studies explained the similarities between EFT and personal goal processing in our 




mPFC, PCC, and left pIPL for personal goals and mind-wandering (see Table V, Figure 4). 
Overlaying these maps on a normalized brain revealed overlaps between the three domains in 
the mPFC, PCC, and left pIPL (Figure 4).  
 
[Insert Table V near here] 
 
[Insert Figure 4 near here] 
 
3.3. Subtraction analyses 
 Finally, we aimed at examining the brain activations that were specifically associated 
with EFT, personal goal processing, and mind-wandering. The current version of Ginger ALE 
does not support contrasts between more than two ALE datasets. We therefore performed the 
subtractions analyses for each combination of domains considered two-by-two. These meta-
analytic subtractions revealed clusters of larger activations for EFT relative to the two other 
domains, specifically (1) in the PCC extending into the right Rsp and PHC, left PHC and 
hippocampus, bilateral pIPL, bilateral temporal gyrus, and bilateral middle/superior frontal 
gyrus for EFT compared to personal goals and (2) in the PCC, right Rsp extending into the 
PHC, bilateral pIPL, bilateral temporal gyrus, and left middle/superior frontal gyrus for EFT 
compared to mind-wandering (see Table VI, Figure 5). Interestingly, we also found that the 
mPFC was more activated for personal goals than both EFT and mind-wandering (Table VI). 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
This showed that both groups of studies (i.e., those involving goal processing only and those 
involving goal processing plus EFT) contributed to the main clusters (i.e., mPFC, PCC, and 
pIPL) that overlapped between the two domains of investigation. Therefore, the similarities 
between the EFT and personal goal processing domains cannot simply be explained by the 




Finally, two clusters in the left Rsp and PHC were more activated during mind-wandering 
than personal goal processing (Table VI). No cluster was more activated during mind-
wandering than EFT. 
 
[Insert Table VI near here] 
 




Episodic future thinking is a complex mental faculty that depends on an ensemble of 
cognitive processes supported by an extended set of brain regions. Our main aim here was to 
test the hypothesis that personal goal processing is one important component of EFT and to 
identify its specific neural correlates. Furthermore, we also sought to determine the 
contribution of goal processing and future thinking in spontaneous forms of self-generated 
thought. To address these questions, we performed a systematic literature search of functional 
neuroimaging studies on EFT, personal goal processing, and mind-wandering before 
computing three distinct ALE meta-analyses of the peak activation foci reported for each of 
these areas of research. We then performed conjunction analyses to determine the overlaps 
between the clusters identified in each meta-analysis, as well as subtraction analyses to 
identify the brain regions that are more specifically associated with each domain. 
As expected, for each domain, the ALE meta-analyses revealed clusters of significant 
activation likelihood in several regions of the DN (Buckner et al., 2008; Raichle et al., 2001), 
including the mPFC, PCC, pIPL, as well as medial and lateral temporal regions. Many studies 




require focused attention on external stimuli (e.g., Mazoyer et al., 2001; Shulman et al., 
1997), and these findings have led to the view that the DN is a “task negative” network, 
implying that it would not contribute to active, goal-directed cognition (for further discussion, 
see Spreng, 2012). However, this view has recently been challenged by a number of studies 
showing that the DN is indeed engaged in many active cognitive tasks, provided that they are 
internally focused, such as autobiographical memory, future thinking, self-reference, and 
social cognition (e.g., Buckner et al., 2008; Kim, 2012; Qin and Northoff, 2011; Schacter et 
al., 2012; Schilbach et al., 2008; Spreng et al., 2009; Van Overwalle, 2009). This suggests that 
the DN is not antithetical to goal-directed cognition per se but instead is characterized by the 
type of information processing it supports: this network would play a general role in self-
generated thought, that is, the capacity to generate mental contents that are not derived 
directly from immediate perceptual input (see Andrews-Hanna, 2012; Andrews-Hanna et al., 
2014b; Klinger, 2009; Schooler et al., 2011; Smallwood et al., 2012; Spreng, 2012). The 
present results support this view and further demonstrate that the DN contributes to personal-
goal related processes during both experimentally induced self-generated thoughts (such as in 
EFT studies) and thoughts that are spontaneously generated when our mind wanders. 
Crucially, our conjunction analyses revealed that EFT, personal goal processing, and 
mind-wandering were associated with overlapping activation in the mPFC, and the direct 
contrast between the three domains showed that activity in this region was highest for 
personal goal processing. This activation profile supports the hypothesis that the mPFC plays 
a key role in the processing of personal goals and that such processing is an important 
component of both EFT and mind-wandering. The exact processing operations that are 
mediated by the mPFC in relation to personal goals remain to be fully specified, however. 
One possibility is that this region contributes to the subjective appraisal of the personal 




or value that may be of critical importance to guide later thoughts, decisions, and behaviors 
(D'Argembeau, 2013; Northoff and Hayes, 2011; Northoff et al., 2006; Roy et al., 2012; 
Schmitz and Johnson, 2007). This account is, for example, supported by the finding that 
activity in the mPFC increases in a linear fashion with the personal importance of the mental 
representations under consideration (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010; D'Argembeau et al., 2012). 
In the particular case of EFT, the mPFC may contribute to appraise and code the relevance of 
represented events with respect to personal goals, which might then modulate one’s 
motivation and effort to attain the imagined state of affairs (D'Argembeau et al., 2010b). This 
idea that the motivational impact of future thinking might be mediated by the mPFC is 
supported by recent research on the role of EFT and mind-wandering in economic decision 
making. It has indeed been shown that engaging in EFT (Lin and Epstein, 2014) or mind-
wandering (Smallwood et al., 2013) is associated with advantageous decision making for 
monetary rewards with higher long-term pay-offs during economic choice tasks. Furthermore, 
neuroimaging studies have revealed that this effect is mediated by neural activity and cortical 
thickness within the mPFC, indicating that this region might indeed play a direct role in 
adaptive decision making processes (Benoit et al., 2011; Bernhardt et al., 2014; Peters and 
Buchel, 2010). 
Another, not necessarily mutually exclusive, possibility is that the mPFC mediates the 
integration of imagined experiences within higher-order autobiographical knowledge 
structures. It has indeed been suggested that the mPFC contributes to the creation of abstract 
knowledge or schemas derived from extracted regularities in episodic experiences, and 
mediates the integration of novel experiences into these pre-existing networks of knowledge 
(Brod et al., 2013; Kroes and Fernandez, 2012; Preston and Eichenbaum, 2013; van Kesteren 
et al., 2012). In the particular case of EFT, such integrative processes might play a role in 




autobiographical knowledge and self-models (Conway, 2005; D'Argembeau and Mathy, 
2011). Recent behavioral studies indeed suggest that many future events are not represented 
in isolation, but instead are linked to other related events and form part of higher-order 
autobiographical knowledge structures that organize imagined events in broader themes and 
causal sequences (D'Argembeau and Demblon, 2012; Demblon and D'Argembeau, 2014). The 
outcome of this integrative process might be the constitution of an overarching personal 
meaning of the event currently under consideration (e.g., its place in a particular’s individual 
life story), and it could be that the mPFC contributes to such process. More generally, the 
integration of anticipated events within autobiographical knowledge structures might 
contribute to the creation of a continual sense of self-identity across time that lays the 
foundation for long-term motivation, decision making, and planning processes (Metzinger, 
2013).  
It is also worth noting that the mPFC has been frequently associated with self-
referential processing in the neuroimaging literature (e.g., Northoff et al., 2006; van der Meer 
et al., 2010; Wagner et al., 2012). It could therefore be argued that the common activation of 
the mPFC in the three domains under investigation here reflects self-processing. While we 
would certainly not dispute this interpretation, it should be noted that “the self” is a 
multifaceted construct that depends on multiple processes (Klein, 2012; Klein and Gangi, 
2010), and therefore it is important to specify which aspect of self-processing is under 
investigation to avoid misinterpretations of neuroimaging findings (Zahavi and Roepstorff, 
2011). In this context, the processing of personal goals can be conceived as one particular 
kind of self-processing (McAdams, 2013). Previous studies have shown that other forms of 
self-processing such as the evaluation of one’s personality traits and retrieval of 
autobiographical memories also engage the mPFC (for a recent meta-analysis, see Martinelli 




characteristics and experiences. Although this awaits further confirmation, the two processing 
operations proposed above—appraisal of personal relevance and integration of information 
within higher-order knowledge structures—might prove useful in accounting for the 
involvement of the mPFC across these different self-related domains. 
Besides the mPFC, the second region of the DN that showed overlapping activations 
between EFT, personal goals, and mind-wandering was the left pIPL. This brain region is a 
cross-modal association area (Seghier, 2013) that is functionally connected to multiple areas 
of the DN (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010; Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014a), and it has been 
associated with a wide range of cognitive functions, including semantic processing, reading, 
theory of mind, spatial cognition, working memory, and episodic memory (for reviews, see 
Cabeza et al., 2012; Olson and Berryhill, 2009; Seghier, 2013). Several recent theoretical 
accounts have been proposed to explain the contributions of the pIPL to these different 
domains, including the maintenance of information in working memory (Vilberg and Rugg, 
2008; Wagner et al., 2005), the integration of spatiotemporal knowledge about event concepts 
(Binder and Desai, 2011),  or the feeling of vividness and re-living that accompanies episodic 
memory retrieval (Ally et al., 2008; Yazar et al., 2012; Yazar et al., 2014). Another 
parsimonious theory regarding the functional role of the pIPL is that this region supports 
bottom-up attentional processes by which salient information automatically captures attention 
(Cabeza et al., 2012; Ciaramelli et al., 2008). Following this view, the common activation of 
the left pIPL during EFT, personal goal processing, and mind-wandering that was evidenced 
in the present meta-analysis could reflect the bottom-up capture of attention by the different 
elements that compose self-generated thoughts. Further studies should be conducted to test 
this hypothesis more directly. 
The third region in which the three domains showed convergent activations in the 




activity in the dorsal PCC (Z = 36) and we also found overlapping activation in the ventral 
part of the PCC (Z = 22), but this time only for EFT and mind-wandering. These differences 
in overlap between the three domains suggest that distinct regions of the PCC might support 
different functions, a proposal supported by connectivity studies showing a functional and 
anatomic fractionation of this area into distinct subregions (Cauda et al., 2010; Leech and 
Sharp, 2014; Zhang et al., 2014). In particular, the most ventral part of the PCC, which was 
associated with EFT and mind-wandering in the present study, is more strongly associated 
with the other DN regions and may contribute to episodic memory retrieval (Cauda et al., 
2010; Huijbers et al., 2012; Spreng et al., 2013; Zhang et al., 2014). On the other hand, recent 
research suggests that the dorsal part of the PCC is more strongly associated with fronto-
parietal areas involved in attentional control abilities (Leech et al., 2012; Spreng et al., 2013; 
Vincent et al., 2008). More specifically, the dorsal PCC might be involved in the control of 
the attentional balance between internal thoughts and external stimuli (Leech and Sharp, 
2014) through the detection of environmental changes (Henseler et al., 2011; Pearson et al., 
2011). Although studies on EFT and reflection on personal goals mostly involve internally 
self-generated thoughts, a minimum continuous monitoring of the external environment is 
nonetheless required during these experiments to follow the task instructions. Furthermore, 
recent studies on mind-wandering have shown that the detection of unpredictable external 
events is not always impaired when the mind wanders (Kam et al., 2013), and might even be 
faster for frequent mind-wanderers (Thomson et al., 2015). A tentative proposal would then 
be that these external monitoring processes during internal thoughts are supported by the 
dorsal PCC, although further studies should be conducted to directly assess this proposal. 
In addition to the mPFC, PCC, and left pIPL, the three domains also showed 
convergent (although not perfectly overlapping) activation in the left middle temporal gyrus. 




support the processing of semantic and conceptual information (Binder et al., 2009; 
Burianova et al., 2010; Svoboda et al., 2006). There is indeed substantial evidence for the 
contribution of semantic memory in remembering the past (e.g., Greenberg and Verfaellie, 
2010) and imagining the future (Irish et al., 2012), and it has been suggested that semantic 
memory may in fact provide the foundation for many, if not all, complex cognitive functions 
(Binder and Desai, 2011). The lateral temporal cortex may in particular be involved in 
representing social (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010; Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014a; Denny et al., 
2012) and personal (Renoult et al., 2012) semantic information. For example, a recent study 
has shown that the left temporal cortex is more activated when imagining social than non-
social scenarios during EFT (Szpunar et al., 2014), and another research has found that 
specific personality traits processed in the left lateral temporal cortex and PCC are assembled 
in the mPFC, probably to form general personality models that are then used to predict how 
others are likely to act in different situations (Hassabis et al., 2014). The left lateral temporal 
region that was observed here may thus mediate the retrieval of semantic knowledge 
(including social and personal information) that provides the foundation for representing 
various forms of self-generated thoughts.  
In addition to common patterns of activation, we also found that EFT, personal goal 
processing, and mind-wandering engaged specific brain areas. Notably, EFT significantly 
activated the ventral PCC, Rsp, PHC, hippocampus, pIPL, and lateral temporal and prefrontal 
cortices to a larger extent than reflections on personal goals. Most of these regions have been 
associated with episodic memory retrieval and recent studies suggest that they form a 
functional subsystem of the DN that supports the construction of detailed mental 
representations of specific events—episodic simulation or scene construction processes 
(Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010; Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014a; Hassabis et al., 2007; Hassabis 




indeed associated with the subjective experience of detailed scenes involving vivid sensorial 
and contextual details, as well as the subjective sense of pre-experiencing the imagined event 
(D'Argembeau and Van der Linden, 2012; Klein, 2013; Mullally and Maguire, 2013; Schacter 
et al., 2012). Such scene construction processes are integral to the generation of specific event 
representations during EFT. On the other hand, personal goal processing can be more abstract 
in nature (Fishbach and Ferguson, 2007), thus relying on scene construction to a lesser extent, 
which may explain the difference in brain activation found in the present study for scene 
construction areas between these two forms of self-generated thoughts.3  
A second prediction that we made regarding the meta-analytic contrasts was that, 
given its spontaneous and often involuntary nature (Stawarczyk et al., 2013; Stawarczyk et al., 
2011a), mind-wandering would recruit brain areas involved in cognitive control to a lesser 
extent than experimentally directed thoughts. As expected, we found larger activity in the 
middle/superior frontal gyrus, one of the main regions of the fronto-parietal control network 
(Niendam et al., 2012; Spreng et al., 2013; Vincent et al., 2008), during directed EFT 
compared to mind-wandering. This result suggests that a difference between directed EFT and 
mind-wandering might be the extent to which the construction of self-generated thoughts 
requires some effortful cognitive processes. These results are in line with recent neuroimaging 
findings on involuntary versus voluntary episodic memory retrieval showing a greater 
involvement of lateral prefrontal regions during voluntary retrieval, with otherwise extensive 
                                                             
3 It should be not that the contrasts selected from the three studies included in our meta-
analysis on personal goals that also included EFT (i.e., Spreng et al., 2010; Spreng & 
Schacter, 2012; Gerlach et al., 2014) probably involved some scene construction processes (in 
addition to personal goal processing). Our investigation of the differences between EFT and 
personal goal processing was thus quite conservative, and the increased activation of scene 




overlaps in DN activity between voluntary and involuntary memories (Hall et al., 2008; Hall 
et al., 2014; Kompus et al., 2011). In the same vein, a recent review of the literature proposed 
that a key difference in the neural basis of voluntary and involuntary cognition relates to the 
involvement of the lateral prefrontal cortex (Dixon et al., 2014).  
It is important to note, however, that the finding that EFT recruits the lateral prefrontal 
cortex to a larger extent than mind-wandering does not necessarily imply that the latter 
reflects the absence or breakdown of attentional control (McVay and Kane, 2010). A recent 
study has indeed shown that transcranial direct current stimulation of the lateral PFC during a 
monotonous task resulted in an increase in mind-wandering frequency without reducing task 
performance (Axelrod et al., in press). Furthermore, neuroimaging findings have revealed that 
during mind-wandering episodes, the anterior midline regions show a positive functional 
connectivity with both the other DN regions and lateral prefrontal areas commonly involved 
in attentional control abilities (Christoff, 2012). Another recent meta-analysis (Fox et al., in 
press) found a cluster of activation in the ventral lateral PFC in association with mind-
wandering and spontaneous thoughts more generally.4 Thus, although we can conclude that 
EFT recruits some prefrontal control areas to a larger extent than mind-wandering, it cannot 
be excluded that some attentional control processes might nonetheless be engaged when the 
focus of attention switches from the task at hand to internal thoughts during mind-wandering 
                                                             
4 The difference in prefrontal activation between this and our own meta-analysis is probably 
due to differences in the criteria used for study inclusion and statistical threshold. Fox et al. 
(in press) indeed used false discovery rate (FDR) corrections rather than cluster-level 
inference for their analyses (for a discussion of the advantages of cluster-level inferences over 
FDR, see Eickhoff et al., 2012). However, besides this difference and a few activations in 





episodes (for further discussion of this issue, see Smallwood, 2013; Stawarczyk et al., 2014; 
Unsworth and McMillan, 2014).  
In summary, the present meta-analysis shows that EFT, reflections on personal goals, 
and mind-wandering depend on a similar set of brain regions that strongly overlap with the 
DN of the brain. We have proposed that these common activations reflect the use of similar 
mental processes in each domain and, most notably, that the mPFC plays a role in integrating 
or evaluating self-generated thoughts with respect to personal goals.  Furthermore, our results 
suggest that similar personal goal-related processes occur in the DN when participants are 
engaged in the effortful imagination of their personal future and when their mind 
spontaneously wanders from the current task at hand. These data are in line with the view that 
the DN of the brain is fundamentally goal-oriented (Andrews-Hanna, 2012) and may support 
the continuous generation and updating of internal predictions that adaptively guide our 
behaviors in a complex and ever changing environment (Bar et al., 2007; Metzinger, 2013; 
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Table I. Studies included in the meta-analysis for the EFT domain 
N° Study Task Comparison task N Foci Comments 
1. (Addis et al., 2007) Future and past 
event elaborations 
Semantic memory 
and visual imagery 
14 23  
       
2. (Sharot et al., 2007) Future event 
imagination 
Fixation 15 24 Coordinates 
not provided 
in the paper 
       
3. (Szpunar et al., 
2007) 
Future and past 
event imagination 
Imagining Bill 




       






10 12  
       
5. (D'Argembeau et 
al., 2008) 




12 6  
       





18 15 Multivariate 
analyses 
       
7. (Spreng and Grady, 
2010) 
Future and past 
event imagination 
Theory of mind 16 17  
       
8. (Weiler et al., 2010) Future and past 
event elaborations  
Imagining Angela 




       
9. (Addis et al., 2011a) Future and past 
event imagination 
Semantic memory 
and visual imagery 
15 9  
       
10. (Addis et al., 
2011b) 








young  and 
older adults 
       
11. (Benoit et al., 2011) Future event 
imagination 
Semantic estimation 12 25 Conditions 




       




25 20  
       




12 29 Participants 
were older 
adults 
       






24 13  
       
15. (Van Hoeck et al., 
2013) 
Future, past and 
counterfactual event 
imagination 
Semantic memory 13 22 
 
       






20 10  
       




Table II. Studies included in the meta-analysis for the personal goal domain 
N° Study Task Comparison task N Foci Comments 














of the paper 
       










11 1 Second 
experiment 
of the paper 
       















       













       








20 3  
       






20 5  
       




20 24 Multivariate 
analyses 
       








15 15  
       










young  and 
older adults 
       
10. (Gerlach et al., 
2014) 
Goal simulation  Odd-even judgment 28 14 Multivariate 
analyses 
       








Table III. Studies included in the meta-analysis for the mind-wandering domain 
N° Study Task Comparison task N Foci Comments 
1. (McGuire et 
al., 1996) 




/ 5 5 Correlational 
analyses 
       
2. (Binder et al., 
1999) 
Resting state Phonetic monitoring 
task 




during rest than 
during the task in 
a mock MRI 
scanner 
       
3. (Mason et al., 
2007) 
Resting state Working memory 
task 
19 20 The participants 
reported more 
mind-wandering 
during rest than 
the task outside 
the scanner 
       




Periods of on-task 
focus 
15 17  
       










in the low 
demanding tasks 
after scanning 
       
6. (Vanhaudenhu
yse et al., 
2011) 
Rating of internal 
awareness during 
the resting state 




       




Periods of on-task 
focus 
22 21  
 
 
       
8. (Kucyi et al., 
2013) 
Periods of attention 
to something other 
than pain 
Periods of attention 
to pain 
51 17  
       




Periods of on-task 
focus 
14 8  
       






Table IV. Peaks of activation for the EFT, personal goal, and mind-wandering domains.  
  MNI coordinates Studies contributing 
 Vol. (mm³) X Y Z to cluster 
Episodic Future Thinking      
      
mPFC 1912 -2 58 -4 1, 2, 4-6, 11, 12, 14, 16 
  -8 46 -12  
      
PCC/Rsp/PHC 4616 -4 -46 34 1-3, 5-8, 10-16 
  -8 -58 24  
  8 -52 12  
  16 -46 0  
      
R pIPL 2048 50 -62 30 4, 6, 8-13, 15, 16, 
      
L pIPL 2480 -48 -68 30 2, 4-6, 8-10, 12, 13, 16 
      
R PHC/Hippocampus 2440 26 -38 -10 2, 3, 6, 7, 10-12, 16 
  26 -18 -22  
      
L posterior PHC 2224 -24 -40 -12 3, 6, 7, 10-13, 16 
      
L anterior PHC/Hippocampus 880 -22 -16 -20 1, 6, 7, 10, 12 
      
R mid. temporal gyrus 1960 58  -6 -18 2, 4, 8, 10, 12-14, 16 
      
L mid. temporal gyrus 1704 -58 -6 -18 1, 2, 6, 10, 12-14, 16 
      
R mid./sup. frontal gyrus 632 22 30 44 1, 14-16 
      
L mid./sup. frontal gyrus 1296 -22 32 46 4, 8, 10-12, 14 
      
Personal Goals      
      
mPFC 2408 -4 50 -10 1, 3-7, 9 
      
Dorsal mPFC 784 -6 58 14 5, 7, 9 
      
PCC 336 -8 -46 36 8, 9 
      
R pIPL  408 48 -60 24 8, 10 
      
L pIPL 896 -50 -72 40 1, 6, 10 
      
R anterior PHC/amygdala 312 24 -10 -22 7, 9 
      
L mid. temporal gyrus 528 -54 -8 -22 7, 9 
      
L sup. frontal gyrus 600 -12 34 52 6, 7, 9 
      
R inf. frontal gyrus 392 52 32 -4 7, 9 
      
L inf. frontal gyrus 312 -52 26 14 10, 8 
      
L orbital inf. frontal gyrus 392 -40 28 -16 9, 10 
      
L caudate nucleus 408 -12 12 14 7, 10 
      
Mind-wandering      
      
mPFC 384 -2 58 -4 7, 8 
      
PCC/Precuneus 792 -6 -50 40 2-4, 7 
      
  -8 -54 28  
      
L pIPL 328 -44 -70 32 2, 7 
      
L posterior PHC 1032 -28 -40 -14 2, 3, 7, 8   
      
L Rsp / posterior PHC 376 -12 -44 6 6, 7, 8 
      
L mid. Temporal gyrus 272 -56 -16 -22 7, 8 




Note: L = left; R = right; mPFC = medial prefrontal cortex; PCC = posterior cingulate cortex; 
pIPL = posterior inferior parietal lobule; Rsp = restrosplenial cortex; PHC = 
parahippocampal; FG = frontal gyrus. The minimal cluster sizes determined by cluster-level 
inferences were respectively 400 mm³ for episodic future thinking, 224 mm³ for personal 
goals, and 272 mm³ for mind-wandering. The numbers reported for the studies contributing to 





Table V. Correspondence across the domains considered two-by-two. 
  MNI coordinates 
 Vol. (mm³) X Y Z 
EFT & MW     
     
mPFC 312 -2 58 -4 
     
PCC  344 -6 -50 36 
  -8 -54 28 
     
L pIPL 200 -44 -70 32 
     
L post. PHC 912 -28 -40 -14 
     
L mid. temporal gyrus 64 -62 -12 -18 
     
EFT & PG     
     
mPFC 832 -6 48 -12 
  -2 56 -6 
     
PCC 168 -8 -50 36 
     
R pIPL 232 48 -60 24 
     
L pIPL 312 -44 -72 32 
     
R PHC 48 24 -12 -22 
     
L mid. temporal gyrus 192 -54 -6 -22 
     
MW & PG     
     
mPFC 184 -2 56 -4 
     
PCC 192 -8 -50 36 
     
L pIPL 176 -44 -70 32 
     
Note: L = left; R = right; EFT = episodic future thinking; MW = mind-wandering; PG = 
personal goals; mPFC = medial prefrontal cortex; PCC = posterior cingulate cortex; pIPL = 





Table VI. Peaks of activation of meta-analytic subtractions across the domains considered 
two-by-two. 
  MNI coordinates 
 Vol. (mm³) X Y Z 
     
EFT > PG     
     
PCC/R Rsp/R post. PHC 2936 -8 -62 28 
  4 -54 12 
  14 -42 0 
     
R pIPL 664 42 -66 32 
     
L pIPL 1000 -54 -70 24 
     
R ant. PHC 1472 30 -32 -12 
     
L PHC 2184 -20 -38 -14 
     
L ant. PHC/Hippocampus 560 -18 -12 -20 
     
R mid. temporal gyrus 768 64 -4 -14 
     
L mid. temporal gyrus 880 -62 -4 -16 
     
R mid./sup. frontal gyrus 408 22 26 42 
     
L mid./sup. frontal gyrus 920 -24 34 42 
     
PG > EFT     
mPFC 648 0 50 -8 
     
EFT > MW     
     
PCC 464 -10 -58 18 
     
R Rsp/PHC 592 8 -46 12 
  18 -46 1 
     
R PHC 640 26 -32 -20 
     
R pIPL 1808 44 -62 32 
     
L pIPL 920 -48 -62 26 
     
R mid. temporal gyrus 1848 58  -6 -18 
     
L mid. Temporal gyrus 672 -58 -2 -20 
     
L mid./sup. frontal gyrus 624 -24 28 48 
     
 MW > EFT     
     
No cluster found     
     
PG > MW     
     
mPFC 632 0 50 -8 
     
Dorsal mPFC 248 -8 62 16 
     
MW > PG     
     
L Rsp/PHC 248 -10 -44 4 
     
L PHC 984 -26 -44 -10 




Note: L = left; R = right; EFT = episodic future thinking; MW = mind-wandering; PG = 
personal goal; PCC = posterior cingulate cortex; pIPL = posterior inferior parietal lobe; Rsp = 





Figure 1. ALE meta-analysis map for the EFT domain. p < .05 (cluster-level corrected 






Figure 2. ALE meta-analysis map for the personal goal domain. p < .05 (cluster-level 






Figure 3. ALE meta-analysis map for the mind-wandering domain. p < .05 (cluster-level 






Figure 4. Correspondence across meta-analyses maps in the mPFC, PCC, left pIPL, and 
lateral temporal cortex. p < .05 (cluster-level corrected inference using p < .001 uncorrected at 
voxel-level as the cluster-forming threshold); EFT = episodic future thinking; PG = personal 






Figure 5. Results of meta-analytic subtractions between EFT and personal goals/mind-
wandering. p < .05 (uncorrected for multiple comparison) with a minimal cluster size of 200 
mm³; EFT = episodic future thinking; PG = personal goals; MW = mind-wandering 
 
 
 
 
